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FOREWORD 
This Research Report focuses on selected potential impacts of new information and 
telecommunications technologies on the political life of society. Issues of this kind were 
addressed in the framework of the Information Technology Task of IIASA's former 
Management and Technology Area in 1981 through early 1983. 
The article, published by Computerworld in October 1983, is actually the result of 
an experiment . One of the authors, Dr. Matthew Nimetz was , as Under-Secretary of State , 
one of the leading political figures involved in formulating the information policy in the 
United States. 
The other author, Dr . Istvan Sebestyen, Research Scholar at IIASA and presently 
Visiting Professor at the Technical University of Graz, is primarily interested in the tech-
nological aspects of new information and telecommunications technologies. 
In this report the authors address, in an interdisciplinary way, a special application 
of new generation videotex systems and how this new technology could be used for express-
ing public opinion. Their intention is to draw attention to an issue which might be one of 
the cornerpoints of a future "information society". 
TIBOR VASKO 
Leader 
Clearinghouse Activities 

Public 
Videolex 
A Democratic Use 
Of New Technology 
By Istvan Sebestyen 
and Matthew Nimetz 
For a democratic society to exer-
cise the will of the people, it must be 
governed by the citizenry. It is es-
sential that the flow of information 
between those who g9vem and 
those who are governed is secured. 
While it is assured that certain 
groups with a common interest (po-
litical bodies, churches, associa-
tions and so on) can make their 
voice heard through the mass me-
dia. it is still relatively difficult for 
the individual citizen to contribute 
on a regular basis to the- flow of 
information between rulers and 
ruled. except for a "yes" or "no" 
every two. four or five years at 
election time. 
Consideration should be given to 
introducing a system that gives due 
weight to the voice of the individ-
ual in a constant manner as policy 
is tormulated and implemented by 
government. We believe that infor-
mation and telecommunications 
technologies, su¢h as the new gen-
eration ot videotex systems. will 
soon proVide valuable tools for ex-
pressing public opinion. At present, 
systems with such applications do 
not exist on any national level, ex-
cept experimentally. But not much 
imagination is needed to foresee 
that within the next few years. such 
systems could be built and intro-
duced on a wide basis. 
It is because of this potential that 
engineers. media experts, industry 
representatives and other groups 
should join with politicians arid le-
gal· experts to discuss and predict 
what this type of system could 
mean tor sociefy. With this article, 
we try to take the first step iil that 
direction. 
In order that we keep in touch 
with reality. the tocus of our ·investi-
gation will be special applications 
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-The Basic Forms of Videotex Systems-
One-way videotex broadcasts in a 
cyclical manner the data frames 
stored on a central computer. In the 
medium called teletext, either the 
vertical blanking intervals of tradi-
tional TV programs are used or dedi-
cated separate channels, such as TV 
cable channels. 
Different types of videotex decod-
ers are used as teletext terminals. The 
decoder is usually built into the TV 
set, and a person uses a numerical 
key pad to select information frames 
(maximum 1,000 characters per 
frame) to be picked out from the in-
formation cycle by the decoder and 
displayed on an ordinary TV. Since 
the amount of information on tele-
text is limited to only a few hundred 
frames , not much local intelligence is 
built into the standard teletext de-
coders. 
Such systems are already widely 
used. Teletext users in Austria al-
ready number approximately 
130,000. In our view, the medium's 
strongest application is linked to 
normal TV programs, such as subti-
tling or information for the hearing 
impaired. 
The amount of information cycled 
on full-channel teletext systems is 
considerably larger, up to about 
50,000 frames, a considerable amount 
of data . Thus, in such cases, intelli-
gent videotex decoders (basically 
dedicated personal computers) have 
to be used to utilize the data present-
ed in the most appropriate way. 
Interactive Versions 
Two-way videotex systems - of-
ten called viewdata in Europe - are 
also built on computers storing data 
frames, similar to the one-way video-
tex systems, except that communica-
tion between the system and the user 
is based on interactive (individual) 
communication as opposed to tele-
text's bPOadcast communication. 
The telecommunications medium 
used for interactive communications 
is the traditional telephone network, 
the emerging data networks and the 
upcoming two-way cable networks. 
Two-way videotex systems have ad-
vantages over one-way systems for 
certain applications, such as individ-
ual message sending, booking and 
transactions. In the future, one-way 
and two-way systems a're likely t~ 
converge so that they supplement 
each other rather than compete. 
At present, different types of two-
way videotex systems are in use. The 
earliest type of videotex systems, 
such as the British Prestel, use modi-
fied TV sets with built-in videotex 
decoders as user terminals. They are 
equipped with numerical key pads 
allowing the user to search for any 
frame in the Prestel " information 
tree" by numbers. 
The standard public-switched 
telephone network is used as the 
telecommunications medium be-
tween the videotex information cen-
ter and the user through a serial in-
terface in the TV set and a low-speed 
asynchronous modem. 
of the new-generation videotex sys-
tems that support public opinion ex-
pression, such as an electronic 
"speakers corner," "notary public," 
"ombudsman" and electronic poll-
ing and voting. By "new-generation 
videotex systems," we mean a na-
tionwide public system, such as will 
be introduced in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and Austria in 1984. 
These systems will be equipped with 
intelligent videotex decoders, such 
as the Austrian Mupid, which is al-
ready on trial in Austria, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the UK and 
elsewhere. Mupid is rented from the 
Austrian postal, telephone and tele-
graph authority (PTT) for about $5 
per month. 
In our context, public videotex 
systems are really nothing more than 
an inexpensive - preferably packet-
switched - computer network al-
lowing mass computer networking 
applications for daily life. Uses in-
clude various information retrieval 
and transaction functions: flight 
schedules and reservations and, per-
haps, payment, through a cheap 
home terminal. Such terminals may 
use the home TV set as an output de-
vice, combined with a cheap dedicat-
ed intelligent videotex decoder (basi-
cally a dedicated personal computer) 
and linked to suitable telecommuni-
cations channels . - a telephone in 
most cases. 
The intelligent videotex decoder 
allows for all the above .components 
to be combined into an intelligent 
home terminal of a sophisticated but 
inexpensive computer network and, 
in addition, functions as a stand-
alone personal computer. 
Public-key cryptosystems and vi-
deotex. Videotex and public-key 
cryptosystems are relatively new 
concepts that emerged during the 
late 1970s (for a basic explanation, 
see In Depth/23). 
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New-generation videotex systems 
use alphanumeric keyboards and in-
telligent videotex decoders (basically 
dedicated personal computers, such 
as Mupid), which extend the original 
functions of videotex user terminals 
tremendously. Not only can informa-
tion frames be retrieved and simple 
transactions (such as booking) be 
performed, but telesoftware frames 
(special information frames) can .also 
be downloaded into the local proces-
sor of the intelligent decoder and ex-
ecuted. Through this philosophical 
change in the use of videotex, a 
whole new range of applications has 
been created. 
One example of such a new appli-
cation is the public-key cryptosys-
tems, to be implemented on videotex 
by means of intelligent videotex de-
coders. Thus, from the technical 
point of view, videotex applications 
using public-key cryptosystems are 
made possible by the introduction of 
intelligent videotex, terminals, the 
use of telesoftware, the standard vi-
deotex message-sending service and, 
in some applications, the use of a 
videotex gateway, which is really 
nothing more than a link between a 
specially programmed third-party 
computer, such as a bank computer, 
and the basic videotex computer net-
work. Through this gateway, video-
tex users can access these third-party 
computers for special videotex appli-
cations, such as home banking. 
Public-key cryptography is based 
on the suggestion of Whifield Deffie 
and Martin Hellmann (both from 
Stanford University) to break with 
traditional schemes of using the 
same encryption/decryption key for 
coding and decoding secret mes-
sages. They suggested using differ-
ent keys for the encoding and decod-
ing processes so that it would be 
possible to reveal the encryption key 
publicly, while still keeping the ap-
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propriate decryption key secret (Fig-
ure 1 ). 
In this way, secure one-way com-
munications could be established. 
Anyone could create and send a se-
cret message to the owner of the de-
cryption key (secret key) without 
having to fear that his message could 
be decrypted by anyone else but the 
Corresponding encryption/decryption key pairs should have the 
following properties: 
1. Ds(Ep(M))=M Encrypting (E) of message 'M' with public 
key 'p,' then transmitting and decrypting (D) 
with secret key 's' should result in the origi-
nal message. This is essential for secure 
messaging. 
2. Dp(Es(M))=M Encrypting the message with secret key 's,' 
then transmitting and decrypting with the 
public key 'p' should result also in the origi-
nal message. This is essential for authentica-
tion. 
3. Publicly revealing encryption and decryption procedures and 
the so-called public keys does not allow individuals to 
find out easily the secret key of a particular user of the system. 
This is needed for secure messaging and authentication. 
4. Public and secret key pairs should be easy to generate. 
owner of the secret key. In 
order to have two-way (per-
son-to-person) communica-
tions, everyone participating 
in the public-key system 
must possess and keep his in-
dividual, secret decryption 
key while announcing pub-
icly his encryption key. That 
encryption key is used by the 
rest of the community when 
<;ecret messages are to be ad-
dressed and sent to him. 
Figure 1 
The usefulness of linking 
public-key cryptography to 
videotex, from the technical 
points of view, should al-
ready be obvious: 
1. The encryption keys 
,yublic keys) of users for 
public access can ideally be 
put on public videotex infor-
'llation frames.as a "public-
~y directory," whereas de-
cryption keys have to be kept 
secretly at the videotex user's 
location. 
2. The message-sending 
capability of videotex can be 
ideally used for sending the 
:oded messages. 
3. The telecommunica-
tions software programs 
needed for encryption and 
decryption of messages are to 
•e stored as information 
trames on the videotex sys-
tem as well and are to be 
downloaded into the intelli-
gent videotex terminal for 
execution when messages are 
to be encoded or decoded. 
4. Certain administrative 
types of functions, such as 
administration of keys and 
keeping track of transac-
tions, can also be solved with 
relative ease by videotex net-
works. 
Recipient's 
pub I ic/secret 
keypair 
generation 
The reason we are inter-
sted in cryptography, and 
especially public-key crypto-
systems, is that this tech-
nique - if linked to a public 
videotex system equipped 
with gateway and intelligent 
videotex decoders - could 
provide many basic services 
Recipient's 1._ • public key 
, ~ 1Recipient's 
Plain text 
Encryption 
of message 
SENDER 
Cipher text 
Figure 2a 
secret key 
Decryption 
of message 
RECIPIENT 
Plain text 
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that will be needed in a fu. 
ture information society. 
The fact that public-key 
cryptosystems with the nov-
el property of publicly re-
vealing an encryption key 
(in our case, on videotex) do 
not thereby reveal the corre-
sponding decryption key has 
some important conse-
quences, which should be 
spelled out separately: 
1. Couriers or other secure 
Sender's 
public/secret 
key pair 
generation 
means are not needed to 
transmit keys, since a mes-
sage can be encrypted using 
an encryption key that was 
publicly revealed earlier by 
the intended recipient. Only 
he can decipher the message, 
since only he knows the cor-
responding decryption key 
(see Figure 2a on In Depth/ 
24). 
Thus, for the distribution 
of encryption keys, an "inse-
cure" channel, such as a 
Sender's 
secret key 
1 ...i Sender's 
publ ic key 
message Signing of 
message 
SENDER 
signed message 
Figure 2b 
Validation 
of message 
RECIPIENT 
validated message 
videotex data base (the public-key di-
rectory), is ideal. 
Nonetheless, privacy of messages 
can still be guaranteed since a poten-
tial "wiretapper" who gets hold of 
the transmitted encrypted message 
only sees "garbage" (the ciphertext), 
which makes no sense to him since 
he does not know how to decrypt it. 
2. As a special use of public-key 
systems, a message can be "signed" 
using the privately held secret key. 
Anyone can verify this signature us-
ing the corresponding publicly re-
vealed key in the "public-key direc-
tory" of videotex. Signatures cannot' 
be forged, and a signer cannot later 
deny the validity of his signature. 
This feature has obvious applications 
in electronic mail, electronic funds 
transfer, electronic voting or "elec-
tronic contracts" (Figure 2b ). If elec-
tronic message sending and transac-
tion systems based on videotex are 
partly to replace the existing paper 
mail and other transaction systems, 
"signing" an electronic message is 
fundamental and must be possible. 
An electronic signature must be 
message-dependent as well as sign-
er-dependent. Otherwise, the recipi-
ent cou.ld modify the message before 
showing the message-signature pair 
to a judge. Or he could attach the sig-
nature to any message ,whatsoever, 
since it is impossible to detect elec-
tronic "cutting and pasting." 
These conditions can be fulfilled 
by a public-key cryptosystem. When 
sending a signed message, the sender 
uses his own secret key (known only 
to him) to "compute" his "signa-
ture." This coded message can be de-
crypted by the recipient by using as a 
decryption key the public key of the 
sender found in the "public-key di-
rectory,'' which is, as we have seen 
above, also used when encoded mes-
sages are sent to him. If the decoded 
message is meaningful, then the re-
cipient of the message has the proof 
that it originated from the sender. 
3. "Signed" messages can obvi-
ously also be sent "secretly" from 
sender to recipient, if the sender en-
codes his "signed" message (through 
his own secret key) according to the 
public key of the recipient looked up 
in the videotex public-key directory 
(Figure 2c). Such a message transmit-
ted by the message-sending service 
of videotex can, as we have seen 
above, only be decoded by the ad-
dressee. 
To enable public-key systems to be 
used for signature, it has to be en-
sured that the encryption/decryp-
tion key pairs used allow subsequent 
coding and encoding (or vice versa) 
of each message without changing 
the original context of the message. 
We believe that public-key crypto-
systems can be widely used in video-
tex networks for a number of novel 
applications. In what follows, we 
only mention a few possibilities, 
some of which are linked with the 
expression of individuals in public 
opinion. 
Public opinion expression. An 
"electronic speakers corner" can eas-
ily be implemented, even on most of 
the present, first-generation videotex 
systems. A prerequisite is to appoint 
or accept a special information pro-
vider who is willing to function as an 
electronic speakers corner. Anyone 
who then wants his voice to be heard 
can send his message to the informa-
tion provider through the message-
sending (note: only with full alpha-
betieal keyboard) service of videotex 
or through the response frame capa-
bility of the videotex textframes. 
It is then the function of the 
speakers corner to put the received 
message on his information frames. 
The question of what or what not to 
put up - thus to exercise a kind of 
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censorship function - is a key issue 
on how the electronic speakers cor-
ner would function. (At this point, it 
should be mentioned that by accept-
ed convention at Speakers Corner in 
Hyde Park in London, the Queen 
and the Royal family, for example, 
may not be abused.) 
Information frames on public 
opinion could be kept on the system 
for a designated time period. Some 
information frames could also be 
supplemented by response frames to 
ask for public reaction to a specific is-
sue. For example, a citizen claiming 
there is a need to build a road that 
bypasses his village could seek sup-
port for his appeal from fellow vil-
lagers through the response frames. 
The speakers corner would, of 
course, cost money to operate. To 
cover expenses, the operator of the 
videotex services - for example, the 
PTT - might be required by law to 
provide the electronic speakers cor-
ner service. In a similar situation, ca-
ble TV operators in the U.S. are often 
required as a condition of their fran-
chise to offer the public citizen chan-
nel free of charge. The amount, fre-
quency and type of information for 
which citizens might use this free vi-
deotex information channel would 
need to be clearly established by law 
or regulation. 
Electronic voting. A simple type 
of electronic voting (lnd public opin-
ion polling is also possible on exist-
ing first-generation videotex systems 
with or without a full alphabetic key-
board. The information provider per-
forming the public opinion polling 
or voting could put up question-
naire-type response frames on the 
system. Subscribers looking up the 
frames of this special information 
provider could then fill in and send 
back the appropriate response 
frames. 
If the information provider had an 
intelligent videotex terminal, such as 
Mupid, he could then process the 
collected response frames, for exam-
ple, to produce integrated final sta-
tistics to show polling and voting re-
sults. This technique may not, 
however, be sufficient under all 
conditions. Polling and voting 
through response frames is linked to 
a specific user identification and 
password, but not to individual peo-
ple. For example, the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analy-
sis is listed as one subscriber on the 
Austrian videotex system. It would 
be a similar case with a family, where 
in Europe the head of the family is 
usually by law the subscriber. 
The videotex system therefore can 
only distinguish a particular sub-
scriber and not the individual users 
working under that subscriber iden-
tification. For this reason, no guaran-
tee is provided by the system, for ex-
ample, to identify whether a new car 
that was ordered through videotex 
was ordered by the father who really 
wants a new car or by his children 
who just thought it would be nice to 
own. 
The same is true, of course, for 
public polling or voting, when indi-
vidual family members may have 
different opinions and certainly 
have separate votes. In order to gain 
further identification, then, usually 
one of the questions asked on a re-
sponse frame is the name of the per-
son filling it in. There is, however, 
no way for the system to check 
whether this type of identification is 
authentic, and in many applications, 
especially voting, authentication is 
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essential. As already mentioned, one 
way to solve the authentication prob-
lem is by public-key cryptosystems. 
Secret message sending is also of-
ten a required need for certain trans-
actions - for example, the message 
between a customer and his bank. 
For-this reason, even though any tra-
ditional computer transaction system 
or videotex provides a certain degree 
of data security, additional measures 
to increase the level of security - for 
example,_ through cryptography -
are always welcome. To introduce 
cryptography on videotex systems 
through public-key cryptosystems is 
one potential way, especially if intel-
ligent videotex decoders, such as 
Mupid, are used. 
In many cases, both authentica-
tion and secrecy are required. In the 
case of voting, the vote has to be au-
thentic. There must be assurance that 
the vote has come from the person to 
whom it was ascribed and that it is a 
valid vote (that is, that the vote has 
been placed only once and not later 
or earlier than it should have been). 
The content of the vote, however, 
should remain hidden from the au-
thentication-checking process. No-
body else should know or be able to 
find out, for example, whether Franz 
Joseph Strauss voted for the SPD (it 
is purely his private affair). Also, at 
the second stage, when the content 
of all votes are revealed and the valid 
votes are added up, again no one 
should be able to recognize that a 
given "yes" for the SPD actually 
came from Franz Joseph Strauss. 
In principle, all these require-
ments can be implemented using 
public-key cryptosystems. How these 
basic functions can be implemented 
on videotex is shown in Figures 3, 4 
and 5. Text editing, encryption and 
description of messages are per-
formed locally by intelligent video-
tex decoders. The programs and en-
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cryption keys needed are 
downloaded from the videotex sys-
tem. 
In the figures, we show the video-
tex public-key directory and the vi-
deotex telesoftware file separately 
for better understanding, but these 
are stored on. standard information 
frames . Messages are sent to the re-
ceivers' mailboxes in a store-and-for-
ward manner through the standard 
message-sending function of vid-
eotex. Actually, the following appli-
cations are built on the basic func-
tions shown in Figures 3 through 5. 
In this whole process, there are a 
few critical technical points that 
have yet to be solved properly. One 
problem is the distribution of the se-
cret private keys. First, appropriate 
key pairs have to be generated, pref-
erably by the key administrator. This 
function could best be accomplished 
I 
I 
I 
r--1--, 
I Sender's I 
I keypair 
1 generation I L Sender's 
- T _[. _ J public key 
Sender·s I - - - - - -
secret key I 
Plain text 
4'---
I 11 Recipient 's I publ ic key 
I 
Encryption of 
m"""geby 
Sender's 
MUPID 
(1) 
(2) 
on a dedicated third-party computer 
linked to the videotex network. The 
public keys can be put on the video-
tex system in a public file by the key 
administrator. The secret key then 
has to be forwarded to the subscriber 
who wants to receive crypted mes-
sages or send authenticated mes-
sages. 
The problem here is that if sent 
through the "insecure" videofex 
message channels, this information, 
in principle, could be wiretapped by 
a third party. One possibility would 
be to pick up .the private key in per-
son from the key administrator. This 
option is certainly secure, but then 
one particular beauty of the public-
key system, the flexible change of 
crypto-keys, is lost. Another possibil-
ity would be to pick up in person a 
crypto-key that is only used for the 
distribution of keys between admin-
Recipient's 
keypair 
generation 
Recipient 's 
public key 
Recipient 's 
secret key 
L-- _, 
Sender's 
public key 
Cipher text 
Decryption of 
m"""geby 
Recipient 's 
MUPID 
(1) I 
(2) I 
_____ _J 
(31 
Telesoltware to be used : 
· Text editing (1) 
Plain text 
Acknowledgement 
· Telesoltware for encryption (2) 
· Tolesoltware for decryption (3) 
Figure 3 
istrator and user. In this way, the re-
quest for new keys would have been 
authorized both by this special key 
and the old private key - the hew 
key would be sent through .the spe-
cial key. The likelihood of both keys 
being stolen is far less than for just 
tapping the private key. 
A third possibility might . be for 
the key administrator to send out in a 
random way special pages contain-
ing various unused private-key op-
tions; each key would get an identifi-
cation number. If a user wants to 
change his private key, he simply se-
lects one of the upcoming private 
keys, which he stores locally, and in-
forms the key administrator through 
the public key which key he has se-
lected as the private key. 
A fourth possibility COl.lld be that 
this selected key is used only tempo-
rarily between user and key adminis-
11 
trator to establish a secure temporary 
channel through which the user 
would finally receive his private key. 
A completely different method of 
key distribution would result if the 
generation of public-key pairs could 
be performed locally by every user. 
In this case, the user would simply 
retain his secret private key and only 
submit his newly generated public 
key to the key administrator. In this 
fashion, the "dangerous" distribu-
tion of private keys from the key ad-
ministrator could be avoided. The 
key administrator would first check 
that the submitted public key does 
not already belong to another sub-
scriber, in which case it would be 
necessary for an alternative key pair 
to be generated and submitted. 
This checking procedure could be 
done by a third-party computer. 
Even if the list of subscribers stored 
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in the system is large (say, millions 
of subscribers), special programming 
techniques can easily be arranged so 
that the checking procedure is fast. 
One known technique, for instance, 
could be to list the public keys in in-
creasing order; then, by using a bina-
ry searching technique, it would be 
simple to find out quickly if the same 
key already exists or not. 
There are certainly many techni-
cal problems associated with this 
technique; for example, the key 
length would need to be as long as 
possible, not only to provide in-
creased security but also to make the 
creation of new, unoccupied key 
pairs by the subscriber easier. Anoth-
er problem to solve is key generation 
itself, which is a rather long, compli-
cated, number-crunching process. 
The number of key distribution 
options is rather broad. The question 
is how far it is worth going in this 
process. Another problem is the pro-
cessing capability of the intelligent 
video-decoder. Let us assume that 
the problem of key distribution is 
solved. According to the Rivest, Sha-
mir and Adleman article, "A Method 
Obtaining Digital Signatures and 
Public-Key Cryptosystems" (in Com-
munications of the ACM), the length of 
the keys used determines-whether an 
"enemy cryptanalyst" would be able 
to break the method in a reasonable 
time period. The authors' estimates 
have shown that a SO-digit key could 
be broken by the fastest algorithms 
and machines of today in approxi-
mately 3.9 hours; 75-digit keys 
would take 104 days; 100 digits, 74 
years; and 200-digit keys, 3.8 times 
10• years (3.8 billion years). 
Common sense suggests that even 
for the most sensitive daily applica-
tions, 75- to 100-digit keys would be 
sufficient. At present, however, it 
would be a cumbersome and time-
consuming problem for microcom-
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puters to process 75- to 100-digit 
keys. Mupid, for example, even with 
its floating-point-Basic version, can 
only handle 12-digit keys in the sim-
plest programming form . 
There is, however, hope on the 
horizon. Reportedly, microcomputer 
encryption I decryption software 
based on the public-key principle is 
already on the market using a 77-dig-
it key. The software operates on Zi-
log Z80 microcomputers under Digi-
tal Research, Inc. 's CP/M system. 
The time needed to generate the en-
cryption and decryption keys ranges 
from 15 minutes to four hours. The 
message encryption and decryption 
take about one minute plus the nec-
essary disk access time. Ron Rivest, 
one of the fathers of the RSA public-
key cryptosystem, and his colleagues 
are reportedly working on a single-
chi p implementation of the system 
that can be used on a microprocessor 
bus, which should be able to process 
about 150 characters per second. It 
seems, therefore, possible. 
Electronic voting. A possible elec-
tronic voting system built on new-
generation videotex is shown in Fig-
ure 6 (on In Depth/31), although 
only the basic functions and links are 
represented. In order not to over-
complicate the chart, we have left out 
the videotex information files con-
taining the appropriate piece of tele-
software needed for encryption I de-
cryption procedures, the file of 
public keys and the videotex mail-
boxes. 
As mentioned earlier, in electron-
ic voting we have three major "ac-
tors": the voter community, a kind of 
"notary public" (or election board) 
and a so-called "vote collector." The 
functions of the notary public in-
clude maintaining the list of voters, 
checking the validity of voters and 
making entries in the voter's list that 
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a vote was made by a certain voter 
and so forth. The notary public must 
also make sure that the votes are au-
thentic and are received in time. He 
should not, however, be aware of the 
content ("yes" or "no") of the vote. 
Aggregation of the votes should 
be done independently by a vote col-
lector. The vote collector should basi-
cally be a third-party computer that 
counts the results and prepares vari-
ous statistics instantaneously. The 
vote collector must, of course, know 
the content of each individual vote, 
but should not know who voted 
what. All these basic functions can 
be fulfilled by public-key cryptosys-
tems as shown in Figure 6. 
In our voting system, the voter's 
intelligent videotex decoder pro-
vides for the authentication of the 
voter by use of his private key, then 
allows the user to vote in an interac-
tive way. It encrypts the actual vote 
("yes" or "no") with the public key 
of the vote colleetor and then makes 
sure that the whole message, that is, 
his authentication (name and digital 
signature) and the encrypted vote, is 
received by the notary public safely. 
To achieve this, the whole voting 
package is encrypted with the public 
key of the notary public that only he 
can decrypt. The actual transfer of 
the vote is done through the mes-
sage-sending service of videotex. 
To process the votes, the notary 
public either has to use intelligent 
videotex decoders or, perhaps, video-
tex decoders combined with a third-
party computer. His first function is 
to decrypt the votes with his private 
key and then to check the authenti-
cation of the voter by using the pub-
lic key. If proof of user authentica-
tion is gained and the vote is 
formally correct, an entry then has to 
be made onto the voter's list to en-
sure that the voter does not vote 
again on the same issue. 
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At this point, the content of the 
vote and the identity of the voter 
have to be separated so that only the 
encrypted vote content is sent over 
with the videotex message service to 
the vote collector. In order to prove 
that this vote was correctly adminis-
trated by the notary public, the nota-
ry public must use his own private 
key to authenticate the message and 
perhaps even put a time stamp on it. 
Also, at this point, an additional en-
cryption would assure that the trans-
mission from the notary public to the 
vote collector is done secretly. This 
action, however, seems to be unnec-
essary because the actual content of 
the vote is sti:ll encrypted. 
The vote collector is also based on 
an intelligent videotex decoder, and 
an external computer would perform 
the following functions: First, it 
checks whether the messages re-
ceived were authorized by the notary 
public; second, it encodes the actual 
content of the vote with its private 
key and performs the vote counting 
and preparation of the various vot-
ing statistics. With this step, the vot-
ing chain is closed. 
Since the entire process is fully 
computerized, any type of voting can 
be performed without major prepara-
tion once the whole system is set up. 
A national system can be installed 
with the technology available today. 
Electronic feedback, In addition, 
electronic voting technically could 
offer other aspects on a completely 
new horizon, namely, votiii.g with 
feedback. What do we understand 
this new concept to mean? 
In control theory, there are two 
classes: control with and without 
feedback. In . both systems, certain 
control actions are taken on one side 
in order to change the behavior of 
the system. The basic difference is 
that in a system with feedback, cer-
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tain measured characteristics of the 
behavior of the controlled system are 
fed back to the controller in order to 
allow for adjustment in the control-
ling process. In a system without 
feedback, the controller takes con-
trolling action on the assumption 
that the system will obey his control-
ling measures. This assumption, 
however, does not always come true. 
A typical example taken from dai-
ly life which covers both systems is 
one's own daily bath. In a control 
system without feedback, one regu-
lates the temperature and volume of 
the water in advance through the 
Voters 
water tap with the aim, say, that after 
five minutes the bath is filled with 
sufficient water at the right tempera-
ture. All of us have certainly experi-
enced occasions when this assump-
tion did not work; either the water 
was far too hot or too cold or the 
quantity of water was .insufficient or 
excessive. For this reason, a control 
with feedback provides much better 
results. One can check from time to 
time whether the temperature and 
level of the water in the- bath are 
right. 
In terms of elections, of course, 
the system is much more complex 
Aggregated 
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Voting system 
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I 
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(Figure 7). The system to be con-
trolled is the voting process. The 
controllers of the system are the indi-
vidual voters, whose controlling 
functions are summed up in the sys-
tem. The output is the aggregated re-
sults of the voting. No such voting 
system yet exists in which the results 
are fed back directly into the voting 
process. One of the reasons is cer-
tainly the technical. difficulties en-
countered in doing so efficiently. 
Rudimentary voting systems that 
do try to take feedback of a first elec-
tion step into account are imple-
mented in a number of countries. For 
example, in France, presidential elec-
tions are divided into two steps. 
TI:ere is, however, no known sys-
tem where the actual results are 
available to the voters during the 
eleetion process where voters could 
modify their votes as long as the vot-
ing deadline is not past. In an elec-
tronic system as described above, this 
feedback would be technically possi-
ble. This set-up could mean that in a 
given election in which the expected 
results are not a simple "yes" or 
"no," voters would have better con-
trol over the voting process .than 
they do today. 
Here we take the election system 
of West Germany as an exam-
ple. Every voter has two 
votes. 
With his first vote, he can 
elect a person to represent 
the local community in the 
Bundestag for the next four 
years. The election process is 
simple. The candidate who 
receives the most votes wins. 
He is, in most cases, a mem-
ber of a given political party, 
whose policies he will likely 
follow during the next term. 
The second vote in this 
system counts in the general 
elections. A voter places his 
vote for a given party, thus 
basically controlling the 
"strength of representation" 
of that party in the new Bun-
destag. These two votes are 
at present the only rudimen-
tary means available to any 
voter. As long as the answer 
is just a simple "yes" or "no," 
this system is fine. However, 
the nature of the real ques-
tions asked is much more 
complex and their number 
far more than two. In a par-
liament with several political 
parties, each with different 
but slightly overlapping pro-
grams, the actual questions 
might better be put as fol-
lows: 
1. Which of the parties 
should be represented in the 
parliament and should most 
likely form the government? 
(In the Bundestag, those par-
ties with less than 5% of the 
vote may not even 'be repre-
sented.) 
2. How strongly should 
those parties that are elected 
be represented in the parlia-
ment? 
For a great number of vot-
ers in the 1983 election, for 
example, the question was 
not a matter of whether they 
wanted to vote for party A or 
B, but rather, whether parties 
A, B, C, D and so on should 
even be represented and, if 
SQ, how strongly . In an inter-
active voting system, these 
questions could indirectly be 
asked and answered by the 
voters. One of the present-
day fears in elections is that 
even after time-, resource-
and energy-consuming cam-
paigns, no real decision is 
reached because according to 
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the voting results, no one 
government with a ruling 
majority can be formed. 
This situation is usually 
deemed to be undesirable 
both for the party concerned 
and for the voter. But be-
cause of the lack of feedback 
in the election process, it 
could easily happen and 
does happen. 
A second concern during 
the recent West German elec-
tion campaign was those 
" lost" votes, which because 
of the 5% limit clause, could 
have unforeseen effects on 
the election process. If, for 
example, the smallest party 
now represented, the so-
called "Greens," had re-
ceived 6% fewer votes than 
they did, then the conserva-
tive party (CDU-CSU) would 
have obtained a majority and 
there would have been no 
necessity for creating a coali-
tion with the Liberals. The 
representation share of the 
" left" would also have actu-
ally been severely influ-
enced. 
In an interactive system, 
the voters could have influ-
enced whether the "Greens" 
should be "in" or "out" and 
if "out," who should have 
gotten the votes instead. 
How could such a sys!em 
really work? Let us take the 
following very simple 
scenario: An election starts at 6 a.m. 
on a particular day, but using the 
electronic voting system of videotex, 
some votes could have been sent to 
the notary public a few days earlier. 
Voting, as described above, could be 
done at home. Now let us assume 
thctt there is no feedback on the elec-
tion progress before noon in order to 
"set the stage," but that after noon, 
voters could get information on the 
voting results through the national 
videotex system or some other me-
dia . Thus, every voter would have 
the chance to modify his vote before 
the close of the election. 
In the U.S., some interaction oc-
curs because voting concludes and is 
tabulated in the Eastern states while 
voting is still taking place in the 
West's later time zones. In the 1980 
election, President Jimmy Carter 
conceded defeat before the polls 
closed in the West. Political analysts 
believe this action influenced Demo-
cratic voters to stay home, which led 
to the defeat of some Democratic can-
didates in those states. 
By this point, careful readers will 
have many serious questions. Yes, an 
interactive voting system is a com-
plex system with dynamic behavior. 
In order to design a stable system 
with functioning feedback, the rules 
of control science have to be applied, 
and the dynamic system behavior 
and feedback mechanism have to be 
fully understood and entirely under 
control. This task is very complex 
and goes beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. But there is good··reason to as-
sui:ne that such a stable interactive 
voting system could, in principle, be 
designed and implemented if there 
were a political consensus support-
ing this approach. 
Such a system could be fully im-
plemented in the next 20 to 30 years 
for full penetration, provided we 
start to think now about how these 
issues and problems could be investi-
gated and resolved and consider all 
the technical problems. It would 
seem worthwhile to carry out pilot 
projects on a local rather than nation-
al basis. 
Thought need also be given to the 
political implications of such systems 
- whether voting will be encour-
aged or discouraged; whether certain 
classes of voters will benefit dispro-
portionately by an interactive sys-
tem; whether an interactive system 
will cause distortions or otherwise 
negatively affect the sense of equal 
participation; or whether a combi-
nated system of traditional ballot 
plus electronic ballots for those· 
choosing the new system will be fea-
sible for a transitional period. 
Electronic opinion polling. Tech-
nically, electronic public opinion 
polling is not much different from 
secure message sending, with or 
without authentication or the mech-
anism presented for electronic vot-
ing. Its main advantage over the 
presently used techniques would be 
that it could allow for public opinion 
polling results to be more quickly 
and frequently collected and on a 
larger scale than practiced today. 
At present, there are still many 
problems associated with public 
opinion polling. Very often there are 
insufficient resources available to ob-
tain truly representative public opin-
ion, and usually the time span is too 
short to obtain decent results. It is al-
most technically impossible to obtain 
solid public opinion polling results 
on any current issue in two or three 
days at acceptable costs. 
Today, 1,000 citizens interviewed 
on a certain topic is considered to be 
a representative result. With elec-
tronic public opinion polling, a 
much better job could be done in a 
shorter time at less cost. With full 
market penetration of videotex, the 
citizens who could be involved easi-
ly in public opinion polling could be 
much larger than today. Similar to 
electronic voting, processing of the 
data can be done instantaneously, al-
most automatically and practically 
without any cumbersome data prepa-
ration. 
If this instrument is applied cor-
rectly, it may provide a most valu-
able and powerful tool for those who 
are (or should be) really interested in 
the public's opinion. 
Electronic ombudsman. The 
"electronic ombudsman" concept ob-
viously does not mean that com-
plaints could be received and investi-
gated automatically by new 
information and telecommunications 
technologies, only that these new 
tools could considerably help. 
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The technical solution for an elec-
tronic ombudsman is rather obvious. 
Through the ombudsman's public 
key, everyone could send secret mes-
sages to him, which could either be 
signed through private keys or be 
-kept anonymous. It is not possible to 
send an anonymous message in the 
present videotex systems. But should 
such a function be required, another 
independent body - let's call it the 
"public's representative" - could be 
established to put messages in an 
anonymous form . 
The messages could be encrypted 
as well. The sender encodes his mes-
sage according to the ombudsman's 
public key and sends it to the pub-
lic's representative for "anonymiza-
tion ." 
The public representative would 
then remove the sender's name 
when transmitting the message to 
the ombudsman. The public's repre-
sentative would, of course, not nec-
essarily be able to read the content of 
the message. 
Problems and prospects. There 
are many problems to be solved be-
fore one could actually start with the 
above applications. From the techni-
cal point of view, an electronic 
speaker's corner could be started any 
time; only the modus operandi, the le-
gal status and the costs need to be 
clarified. 
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As far as electronic voting is con-
cerned, we are not ready at this 
point, even from a technical point of 
view, to start, but there can be little 
doubt that all the hardware and soft-
ware problems could be solved in the 
near future. 
We estimate that a fully operation-
al system could be set up in about 
two or three years' time. 
The actual problems lie in a differ-
ent area. First, the user penetration 
of such systems takes time. Market 
penetration to 80% of all households 
in the U.S. for n~w media were: 
• Radio in 19 years. 
• Black-and-white television set, 
nine years. 
• Color television set, 25 years. 
• Telephone, 72 years. 
• Cable television, projected at 73 
years. The penetration of videotex, 
the cheap computei: network for dai-
ly life, on the market will certainly 
not take place any more quickly than 
the fastest of the above media. 
For this reason, our guess would 
be that at least one generation (25 
years) would be required to achieve 
an acceptable level of videotex cover-
age so that instant voting could be 
possible from virtually every house-
hold. 
If full user penetration is not 
achieved, then a possible political 
concept of "more direct democracy 
by the citizens through new infor-
mation and telecommunications 
technologies" could also not be 
achieved. 
Those people who for some reason 
do not have easy access to videotex 
terminals (because they cannot af-
ford it, because they live in remote 
areas with an insufficient telecom-
munications infrastructure, or be-
cause they do not want it) would not 
have an equal ability to participate 
with those people who do own them. 
We estimate that the shortest time 
horizon possible for full penetration 
and introduction of such systems. 
would be one generation - and 
then, only for the most developed 
parts of the world. Until then, elec-
tronic voting could become one of 
the election alternatives, such as vot-
ing by mail or at polling booths. But 
its full impact would, of course, not 
be felt or really gained in respect to a 
more direct democracy. 
In the moderately developed and 
less-developed countries, the pene-
tration period is, of course, even 
longer. Thus, unforeseen conflicts 
may arise. Let us assume that more 
public participation and direct de-
mocracy is desired in two given 
countries in a future information so-
ciety and that one is well-developed 
and the other not. Is this not yet an-
other source of difference between 
rich and poor? 
Another possible conflict situation 
could be the following. Imagine a 
well-developed country in which 
more public participation in govern-
ment and more direct democracy 
were technically possible, but the 
present establishment wishes to re-
tain the status quo in governing and 
restricts the introduction of technol-
ogies that would allow more citizen 
participation. 
This situation may lead to political 
conflicts and .changes in dynamics 
between government and governed. 
In general, in any information-
rich society with the appropriate 
technical infrastructure for direct de-
mocracy and public participation in 
governing, it will be important to 
consider: 
1. The domain of those issues in 
which decisions should be made 
jointly with the public through in-
creased direct democracy. 
2. The domain of those issues 
where the opinion of the individual 
is requested and the results of the 
public polling are publicly an-
nounced but the final decisions are 
taken by the appropriate govern-
mental bodies. 
3. Finally, the domain where de-
cisions are taken solely by the gov-
ernment without asking for public 
opinion (for example, in some na-
tional security questions). 
Determination of the above do-
mains could prove to be a major issue 
in an election campaign, depending 
on how each party would handle 
these questions if it won power. 
In public-key cryptosystem appli-
cations (such as secure message send-
ing, authentication, public opinion 
polling, electronic voting and so on), 
the administration of the public keys 
will also be of major importance. 
In the case where the encryption/ 
decryption key pairs are generated 
by the key administrator, then the 
administrator - and, in principle, 
only he - will be in a position to 
control all information and transac-
tions flowing through the system. 
In some countries, this control 
might simply not be acceptable. For 
these countries, the system whereby 
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the keys are generated by the user 
and only the encryption key is for-
warded to the key administrator 
might prove to be more acceptable. 
However, even then the adminis-
tration of the encryption keys is so 
important that some countries may 
decide in public systems that_ the ad-
ministration of public keys should be 
a government monopoly, say, the 
PTT or some central governmental 
agency. In other countries, a commis-
sion somewhat independent of the 
government might inspire greater 
confidence. 
Vulnerability is also a problem is-
sue. If banking transactions, elec-
tronic voting and so forth are per-
formed by means of public-key 
systems, then the vulnerability of the 
system and especially of the key ad-
ministration is of utmost importance. 
A terrorist attack on a single key ad-
ministration center could seriously 
affect the daily life of society in a 
way similar to the effect that a poison 
attempt on a city's water supply by 
terrorists or lunatics would have. . 
All in all, there are plenty of prob-
lems to be solved. 
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